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1. Introduction
In this paper we show that the two most widely given explanations for the rise of
protection over the past twenty years|antidumping protection and voluntary export
restraints|are fundamentally inter-related.1 We argue that voluntary export restraints
(VERs) are a natural consequence of cost-based antidumping (AD) legislation. Speci-
cally, when governments implement cost-based AD under incomplete information about
foreign costs, foreign rms undertake VERs in an attempt to convince domestic author-
ities that they are not competitive threats. We show that under typical circumstances
VERs simply muddle the government's perception and lead it to levy AD duties in
a very clumsy and inecient fashion. In fact, we show that although cost-based AD
raises welfare under complete information, the distortions inherent with implementing
it under incomplete information make it an undesirable policy.
Three important institutional characteristics of AD law motivate our approach.
First, cost-based AD petitions have become \the dominant feature of U.S. antidumping
law" (Horlick, 1989, p. 136). Traditionally, dumping was dened as international price
discrimination, but in 1974 the denition was broadened to include sales below cost.2
According to Clarida (1996) since 1980 between one-half and two-thirds of U.S. AD
cases have been conducted using the cost-based denition of dumping.3 Not coinciden-
tally, Bhagwati (1988) and Krueger (1995) both date the rapid increase in high-track
(VERs) and low-track (AD duties) restraints to the mid-1970s. From this perspective,
if one seeks to understand the rise of AD protection and the proliferation of VERs,
cost-based AD policy is a sensible place to start.
Second, governments implement cost-based dumping under incomplete information.
Under cost-based dumping, the domestic government estimates the foreign rm's pro-
duction costs and then constructs an AD duty designed to insure that the exporter's
price is \fair." Not surprisingly, the ambiguous nature of estimating the foreign rm's
1Almost 10% of U.S. imports were covered by antidumping orders in 1990, almost triple the coverage
in 1980. During the same period the number of VERs doubled (Krueger, 1995; Low, 1993).
2Clarida (1993) and Ethier (1982) explain why rms sell below cost but neither incorporates VERs
into their analysis.
3Dierent methods and denitions for evaluating Department of Commerce methodology explains
the dierent estimates. Note also that the EC, the other major user of AD, has similarly embraced cost-
based methodology. Messerlin (1989) estimates that over 90% of EC cases against developing countries
are based on constructed costs.
1costs is the source of numerous complaints. Foreign defendants often claim that esti-
mated costs have nothing to do with their actual costs. Rules such as the use of \best
information available," which bases the cost estimate on the domestic rm's estimate
of foreign costs, and ad hoc methods such as basing cost estimates on third market
surrogates make AD procedures quite capricious. Cost uncertainty in conjunction with
the arbitrariness of the methods for constructing costs makes AD an ominous threat for
all foreign rms regardless of their true eciency.
Third, foreign rms often undertake VERs prior to any AD investigation hoping to
appease domestic cries for protection. For instance, the 1981 automobile VER, perhaps
the best known VER, was negotiated under the threat of an AD action. Similarly, many
of the steel restraints undertaken in the mid-1980s were negotiated under the threat
of imminent AD action. Krueger (1995, p. 35) states that \threats of administered
protection have induced trading partners to accept other bilateral measures, such as
VERs" (emphasis added). A senior negotiator in the semiconductor dispute stated that
the U.S. industry used \the threat of the dumping case to stimulate broad negotiations
on all aspects of the problem" (Prestowitz, 1988, p. 196, emphasis added). In such
circumstances, the VER is conceived of as a \pressure-release valve," where foreign
rms reduce exports until protectionist sentiments subside.
We incorporate these three institutional features into a stylized model and demon-
strate how VERs and cost-based AD are inter-related. The starting point for our anal-
ysis is the long understood insight that governments have an incentive to implement
cost-contingent protection (Brander and Spencer, 1984). We interpret cost-based AD
as a GATT/WTO sanctioned vehicle for implementing a cost-contingent tari policy.
While this interpretation of cost-based procedures diers from GATT guidelines, many
Department of Commerce (DOC) decisions are so perplexing that the our interpretation
is a plausible view how AD is implemented in practice (Boltuck and Litan, 1991).
We also suppose that the home government cannot observe the foreign rm's costs;
we show that this induces the foreign rm to announce a VER in order to signal its
(in)eciency in an attempt to reduce the size of the potential duty. In other words, the
foreign rm agrees to restrain sales in order to forestall calls for even more restrictive
measures.
Interestingly, as is often the case in practice we nd that the VER fails to release
the protectionist pressures and domestic industries clamor for more protection. For
2instance, despite the measures taken by the Japanese semiconductor producers to diuse
the calls for protection, a cost-based AD complaint was ultimately led. In fact, a review
of AD cases suggests that preemptive export restraints have only had mixed success at
averting AD investigations. As a noted AD expert stated, VERs \have certainly been
instrumental in preventing a number of antidumping proceedings from arising, but (they
are not) ::: a substitute for relief" (Bellis, 1989, p. 54). Moreover, and perhaps most
surprising, we nd that the VER causes the AD duties to be particularly ineptly levied:
excessively high duties are assessed against inecient exporters and undesirably low
duties are imposed on ecient producers. In other words, the preemptive VER not
only does a poor job releasing protectionist pressures, but is at least partly responsible
for the widespread perception the AD duties are often excessive.
Our approach diers from Harris (1985) and Krishna (1989) who emphasize the
collusive and cartel-enhancing features of VERs.4 While the facilitating practice ex-
planation is a powerful ex post justication for VERs, we have found no evidence that
collusion was the original motivation for a VER at the outset of any trade dispute. As
Low (1993, p. 114) succinctly stated, saying that a VER is voluntary \is like saying that
a man asked to be shot in the foot, without mentioning that he had the choice of being
shot in the foot or in the head."
Our paper complements the recent work by Anderson (1992) and Rosendor (1996).
Both study the interaction between VERs and AD duties, but their models dier from
ours in several important ways. In both their models the VER is undertaken after
the AD complaint is already led; we suppose the VER is undertaken before the AD
petition is led. More signicantly, they assume that the VER is a substitute for AD
protection (i.e., the VER is assumed to release pressure). In our model the extent to
which the VER forestalls further AD activity is endogenously determined.
Our analysis is also of interest from a technical viewpoint. We show that the standard
\single crossing" property (also referred to as the Spence-Mirrlees sorting condition)
does not hold in our model. In our context a key issue is the extent to which producers
are willing to restrain exports in order to avoid the AD duty. For a given duty, if
at every quantity level inecient producers were more willing to restrain output than
more ecient producers, then the single crossing condition would be satised. We
demonstrate that single crossing does not hold and that producers' preferences are
4Staiger and Wolak (1989, 1992) and Prusa (1992) also emphasize AD's role for maintaining cartels.
3characterized by a \double crossing" property.
If the model were characterized by single crossing, it is well known from the work of
Cho and Sobel (1990) that the stable equilibrium involves separation, albeit with some
distortion to trade. If this were the case then cost-based AD could be justied, at least
to the extent that duties were being levied optimally. We show that double crossing
inhibits rms' ability to separate and leads to pooling. This in turn implies AD duties
are levied sub-optimally. Thus, distortions occur before and after the investigation,
making cost-based AD a particularly futile policy.
Bernheim (1991, 1994) has examined dividend policy and social behavior when in-
dierence curves violate single crossing. Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) also argue that
Veblen eects in consumption arise when single crossing fails. The similarities between
our model and these papers is largely limited to the equilibrium renement used and
the persistence of pooling outcomes. However, the nature of the underlying preferences,
the structure of the games, and the characterization of the resulting equilibrium are
substantially dierent. The properties of our model are closest to those of Cho (1994)
who revisits the limit pricing argument of Milgrom and Roberts (1982).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide some additional
background on AD law to motivate our modeling approach. In Section 3 we describe the
extensive form of the game and in Section 4 solve for the unique equilibrium behavior
of the players once the dumping case is completed. However, as is the case in most
signaling games, there is a plethora of equilibria in the overall game. In Section 5 we
discuss reasonable beliefs renements and establish the equilibrium concept. Readers
interested primarily in the intuition of the results may prefer to skip the technical
discussion contained in this section. In Section 6 we provide the solution to the model
and in Section 7 we show that a pooling outcome emerges under most reasonable demand
and cost parameter values. The welfare implications of cost-based AD are discussed in
Section 8. Policy implications and the applicability of our ndings to other economic
issues are discussed in Section 9.
2. Antidumping as a threat
Under GATT/WTO rules, AD duties can be levied if (i) imports are sold at less than
fair value and (ii) these imports cause material injury to the domestic industry. Under
4current rules both parts of the AD determination are quite easy to satisfy. Since 1980
the DOC has found dumping in 95% of its decisions (Hansen and Prusa, 1995). As
Low (1993, p. 86) states \virtually any industry that considers itself adversely aected
by foreign competition and presents a competently assembled petition, stands a good
chance demonstrating ::: that it is under attack."
There is little doubt that the law is heavily biased against foreign rms (Boltuck
and Litan, 1991). It often appears that the government does not attempt to accurately
measure costs. Consider for instance that any failure by the foreign rm to respond to
the DOC's onerous reporting requirements allows the DOC to disregard all its data and
instead use the best information available, which typically means data reported in the
domestic rm's petition (Murray, 1991). Further, after the foreign rm's variable costs
are estimated DOC adds 10% for overhead and 8% for prot, additions undoubtedly
distort costs.5
The arbitrariness of AD proceedings surely encourages foreign rms to take actions
to avoid them. In addition, the legal costs surrounding an AD investigation are often
prohibitive with estimates typically in the range of $500,000 to $1 million per rm
(Braga and Silber, 1993; Mendez, 1993). Moreover, if the foreign rm is unlucky enough
to be named in an AD case and have its case completed, it is usually confronted with
a formidable tari barrier. For example, during 1990 and 1991, the average AD duty
was 55.5%, as compared with those products average MFN tari of 14.4% (Anderson,
1993).6
With its ominous record of restricting trade, deterrence appears to be at the heart
of the U.S.'s antidumping policy. For example Krueger (1995, p. 35) states that AD
law is designed \with the clear intent of pressuring for a VER." As mentioned above,
semiconductors and automobiles are both examples of how the threat of an AD petition
can spur a VER.
The three key elements of our model, however, are most clearly evidenced by the
steel industry, by far the heaviest user of the law, accounting for more than one-third
of all AD petitions. First, most steel petitions are based on cost allegations (Clarida,
1996). Interestingly, it was at the behest of the steel industry that the denition of
5For perspective, in 1989 only two of the fteen largest companies in the Fortune 500 passed the 8%
prot test.
6The trade consequences of such large duties are dramatic: Hoekman and Leidy (1991) nd that on
average targeted imports are 40 percent lower three years after AD duties are levied.
5dumping was broadened to include sales below cost in 1974.
Second, the steel industry uses the specter of AD investigations to deter foreign pro-
ducers. The industry is a master at raising the visibility of their plight and threatening
burdensome trade restraints. These threats have not been wasted as producers from all
over the world have restrained steel exports in order to avoid the credible threat of an
AD investigation.
Third, steel petitions are most often threatened against the most ecient producers.
For example, in 1978 estimated costs for a ton of steel were $71 in Japan and $114 in
the U.S. (Jones, 1986). The fact that the Japanese were so much more ecient than
other foreign producers was precisely the reason why they were targeted by the U.S. In
calculating its preliminary margin, the DOC based its estimates on data provided by the
plainti in accordance with the \best information available" principle and established
a duty of 32 percent. Patrick and Sato (1982) report that when the \Japanese industry
came to realize it would benet more from high rather than low cost estimates" the
executives of the major steel rms initiated talks for a VER.7 But, while the ecient
Japanese have been targeted in a number of AD petitions, hundreds of AD petitions
have also been led against less ecient steel producers. Naturally, the burden of AD
duties have been heavier for relatively inecient producers.
3. The Model
We describe a scenario where a single foreign producer competes against a home rm
under the scrutiny of the home government. Broadly speaking, the game can be thought
of as occurring in two distinct phases: pre-AD and post-AD determination. During the
rst part of the game the foreign rm is aware of the build-up of protectionist pressure.
It also understands the home country's rent-extracting and prot-shifting incentives for
implementing an AD policy where lower cost rms will be subject to higher AD duties.
Thus, during the rst part of the game the foreign rm's export decision is strategic since
it can inﬂuence the government's posterior beliefs about the foreign rm's eciency. We
will show that the export decision involves a choice of either myopic prot maximization
7The 1977 steel dispute was resolved with the trigger price mechanism (which explicitly based market
prices on the DOC's estimates of Japanese costs). This agreement fell apart partly because of Japan's
unhappiness with bearing a disproportionate share of the total decrease in steel exports. Within a few
years the trigger price was replaced with explicit quantity restrictions.
6or a VER which might conceal the rm's true type and alleviate protectionist sentiments.
The extensive form of the game has the following structure. The foreign rm's
constant marginal cost is drawn from the set T = fC1;:::;C Tg,w i t hCi <C j for i<j ,
according to a commonly known probability distribution, . The realization of the cost
is private information for the exporter and will be referred to as its type. For simplicity
we will use i to denote the type of exporter with true cost Ci.
In the rst period, we assume that the foreign rm's exports are subject to a specic
tari of 0  0. Given this information, the foreign rm chooses and announces its rst
period export quantity, Q. Following the decision of its rival, the home rm chooses its
rst period quantity, q.
At the conclusion of the rst stage the government observes the level of imports and
home production and then forms beliefs about the eciency of the foreign rm. If an
AD petition is led, the government selects a per unit AD duty, D  0, which will
remain in eect during the next N periods of trade. Given the level of the AD duty the
two rms compete simultaneously in quantities for the remainder of the game.
A couple of comments about the design of the game are in order. First, we are
modeling a situation where the home government has an AD statute and the home rm
has an opportunity to le an AD petition at the end of the rst period. As discussed
above, it is not the foreign rm's costs per se that are the impetus for the investigation,
but rather the high level of trade associated with an ecient rm. Thus, the foreign rm
has an incentive to voluntarily restrict its exports in order to reduce the potential duty.
Moreover, it is common knowledge that the foreign rm is likely to announce a VER;
therefore it is natural to assume that the home rm will wait to observe the foreign
rm's actions before proceeding with rst period sales and its ling decision. Thus, we
model the home rm as a Stackelberg follower.8 Besides this intuitive justication for
the Stackelberg assumption, in a game with simultaneous moves, verifying the incentives
of the foreign rm to deviate from a given equilibrium while holding the action of the
domestic producer xed does not seem sensible if the deviation cannot be supported by
another reasonable equilibrium.
Second, as is common in the signaling literature, we assume that the home rm
8Since there is no obvious reason to give any rm the advantage of a rst mover in subsequent periods
we model the competition  a la Cournot. Furthermore, the mode of competition is inessential for the
analysis of the post-duty subgame.
7learns the true costs of the foreign rm after the AD investigation.9
Finally, demand in the home country is assumed to be linear p = a − Q − q.T h i s
simple functional form will allow us to describe the behavior of the players without
resorting to abstract arguments.
4. Analysis of the subgame following the AD petition
4.1. Firm decisions
We are looking for a solution which will prescribe a self-enforcing norm of behavior for
each of the three players. This implies that at minimum the selected equilibria should
satisfy backward induction. Since the subgame starting after the government chooses an
AD duty has a nite number of periods, N, the linear structure of the model guarantees
that it has a unique path which is part of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
In any stage n of this proper subgame a type i foreign rm takes the total per unit
levy, t = 0 + D, as given and maximizes its (variable) prot function
i(Q;q;t)=Q(a − Q − q) − tQ − CiQ:
The per-period payo for the domestic rm is
(Q;q)=q(a − Q − q) − cdq;
where cd denotes the domestic rm's marginal costs.
At each stage the resulting optimum quantity for a type i exporter is
e Qn
i =( a + cd − 2Ci − 2t)=3( 1 )
and for the domestic rm is
~ qn(i)=( a + Ci + t − 2cd)=3; (2)
9If costs are not revealed after the determination is made, we would enter a typical limit pricing game
in which the ecient types would try to prove themselves. This would shift the analysis away from the
issue at hand. Of course, such problems would not arise if competition continues to be sequential in
future periods.
8where we use the superscript n to denote that these are solutions to the subgame
following the AD duty.
The total prot (over all N periods following the AD duty) is
N  e n
i =( N=9)(a + cd − 2Ci − 2t)2 and N  e n(i)=( N=9)(a + Ci + t − 2cd)2: (3)
4.2. Optimal AD duty
As discussed earlier, we will assume that the government uses its cost-based policy
to implement a duty that maximizes host country welfare. While this assumption
does not follow ocial AD procedures it does seem consistent with empirical evidence
and captures the more general pressures on governments to devise ecient protection
schemes.
Assuming for the moment that the host government could observe the true cost of
the exporter its payo for the N period subgame would be the sum of consumer surplus,






Using the unique subgame outcomes the welfare can be expressed as
w(i;t)=N

(2a − Ci − cd − t)2=18 + (a + Ci + t − 2cd)2=9+
+ t(a + cd − 2Ci − 2t)=3

: (5)
When an AD petition is led the government chooses D to maximize (5), yielding a
total levy of
~ ti =( a − Ci)=3: (6)
The above expression makes it clear that higher duties are levied against more ecient
exporters. If an ecient exporter does not voluntarily restrict rst period exports and
behave like a more inecient exporter and if a petition is led, the home government
would levy an AD duty in the amount of D = ~ ti −0. From this point on, a total tari
t> 0 is to be understood as the initial tari plus an AD surcharge equal to t − 0.
Hence we will use the terms tari and duty interchangeably to describe the total level
9of protection. To keep the model as simple as possible, we will assume that 0  ~ tT,
which implies that an AD petition will be led against all types.10
Finally, we note that the marginal benet to the home country from lowering the AD
duty is increasing in Ci. This implies that the government's best response is monotoni-
cally decreasing in the posterior likelihood of a more inecient exporter. This explains
the desire of each type to be considered type T.
5. The Equilibrium Concept
Solving the game backwards we proceed to analyze the rst stage. In this three-player
signaling game the foreign rm (the sender) signals its type through its export choice;
the home rm then chooses its output level and whether to le a petition; nally, the
government (the receiver) levies an AD duty based on its beliefs about the type of the
exporter. The payos from a selected strategy prole in this reduced game are given
by adding the rst period prot and welfare to the Cournot subgame prot and welfare
dened above.
Since any reasonable equilibrium must involve the unique outcome in the second
stage Cournot subgame, any concerns about the multiplicity and reasonableness of
equilibria will stem from rst period actions. We will refer to a solution to this reduced
game as a self-enforcing outcome for the whole game.11
In games with incomplete information the formation of beliefs is often controversial.
We would like to nd a solution which is supported by a reasonable belief-formation
process. From a game theoretic standpoint we want our equilibria to resemble closely
the properties of a strategically stable set as dened by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).12
10This is not a restrictive assumption since the most frequent users of cost-based AD, the U.S. and the
EC, also have very low MFN taris. In addition, a higher initial tari would introduce another stage to
the game without providing additional insight. At this stage, the domestic rm would make a decision
whether to le a petition. Since the beliefs of the government are common knowledge in equilibrium,
the rm would obviously le a petition if the beliefs entail a positive AD duty.
11In general, a self-enforcing outcome of a game need not induce a stable outcome in every subgame or
vice versa. However, under conditions satised by our model Cho (1993) shows that in two-player sender-
receiver games (with nite strategy spaces) a strategically stable outcome (in the sense of Kohlberg and
Mertens, 1986) contains an equilibrium which induces a stable outcome in every subgame.
12Strict reference to stability throughout the paper is not warranted, however, since the concept is
not dened for games with continuum of strategies. Our game can be viewed as an approximation to a
game with a large nite number of strategies. For an extensive discussion of stability in the context of
signaling games we recommend the excellent book by van Damme (1987).
10Cho and Kreps (1987) and Banks and Sobel (1987) provide reasonable restrictions on
the beliefs of the receiver o the equilibrium path which do not eliminate and often
lead to the unique stable component in two-player signaling games. We will now extend
their arguments to our three-player model and describe the equilibrium concept which
we will employ.
The rst requirement we impose on our equilibria is that they are sequential (Kreps
and Wilson, 1982).13 Hence we require (a) all players to maximize their respective payo
functions given the strategies of the others and the beliefs of the government (sequen-
tial rationality) and (b) the induced beliefs about the rm's cost at each export level
obtained with positive probability should be compatible with the strategies of the two
rms in the sense of Bayes' rule (consistency). At quantities exported with probability
zero any beliefs which rationalize the behavior of the government are permissible.
The requirement that the solutions be sequential equilibria is quite weak. In fact, the
only new element which the above restriction introduces in addition to the requirements
for a Nash equilibrium is that at zero probability export levels the government is not
allowed to announce irrational duties. The sequential equilibrium concept allows for a
multiplicity of beliefs o the equilibrium path. Hence, if we impose only this restriction
our game will have a continuum of pooling, semi-pooling, and separating equilibria.
Following the general program developed by Cho and Kreps (1987) and Banks and
Sobel (1987) we will rene the set of sequential equilibria by eliminating those which
assign unreasonable beliefs at null events. In particular, we will require the government
to perceive each out of equilibrium quantity as a possible signal by the exporter and
place probability zero on a type which is unlikely to send it.
Suppose that we have a sequential equilibrium whose stability we would like to check.
Let one of the three players contemplate deviating from the proposed equilibrium. The
rst restriction that we impose requires this player (a) take into account all combinations
of best responses by the other players at information sets likely to be reached by the
deviation strategy14 and (b) disregard all pure actions which do not maximize his payo
at a given information set, holding the strategies of the other players xed. In our
13Since the sequential equilibria concept is not dened for games with a continuum of strategies, we
work with its extension provided by Kreps and Sobel (1994).
14In his formulation of a forward induction equilibrium Cho (1987) imposes the same requirement for
general extensive games. His subsequent restrictions, however, are weaker than the ones we employ in
this paper.
11context this means that the AD duties available to the government are those which
can be rationalized by some beliefs about the type of exporter. The restriction also
implies that the only strategy that the home rm has is its unique (Stackelberg follower)
maximizer.
Despite its intuitive appeal such a reduction of the game is ad hoc and may lead
to the elimination of reasonable equilibria. The above process can be justied in nite
games by a well known result due to Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). They show that
for any game and a stable set of equilibria of that game if a pure strategy of a player
does worse in every equilibrium than his equilibrium prescription (i.e., if the strategy
is never a weak best response relative to the set), then after deleting this strategy from
the action set of that player, the subset of equilibria of the original stable set which
assign probability zero to that particular action contains a set which is stable in the
restricted game. The same result holds if a pure strategy is dominated.
We now assert that a strategy which is not a best reply for the government and
the home rm to a given level of exports is strictly dominated.15 Hence, the result of
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) guarantees that we will not discard a stable outcome if
as a rst step in the renement process we restrict the strategy sets of the government
and the home rm to their respective best responses.
In proving our claim, it is important to realize that the best reply function of the
government is independent of the rst period strategy of the home rm. Figure 1 can
be useful in clarifying this point. In order to make our argument as clear as possible,
we depict a simplied version where there are only two types (T = 2) and each player
only has two pure actions. As depicted, nature chooses the foreign rm's type (1 or 2);
after observing its type, the foreign rm makes an export choice (Q1 or Q2); the home
rm then chooses its production level (q1 or q2); nally, the government levies a duty
(t1 or t2).
Consider a pair of strategies for the foreign and home rms such that the informa-
tion set of the government after (Q1;q 1) is reached with positive probability (i.e., the set
containing the nodes x and y). The best response of the government at that information
set depends on the relative likelihood of the two nodes. Each node, however, is reached
b yt h eh o m e r mp l a y i n gq1 with the same probability. Hence, the only relevant infor-
mation for the optimization problem at the government's information set comes from






















































Figure 1: The extensive form of the rst period subgame (2 types, 2 actions)
the randomizations of nature and the exporter. Therefore, the proof of our claim that a
strategy that is not a best reply for the government is strictly dominated is the same as
in two-player games and is a standard application of the separating hyperplane theorem
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1992).
Applying similar arguments it is also clear that the home rm's best response func-
tion does not depend on the strategy of the government. Given any choice of exports
and AD duty, the home rm will produce its unique Stackelberg maximizer. Every other
action of the home rm can be discarded on the basis of the proposition of Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986).
The restrictions on the behavior of the foreign rm which we require constitute a
straightforward adaptation of the D1 criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) which is based
on the notion of universal divinity of Banks and Sobel (1987). This renement is now
formally presented.
Fix a probability distribution over the end points of the signaling subgame induced
by a sequential equilibrium in which an exporter of type i obtains a prot (over all
13periods) of 
i. Call this probability the outcome of the game associated with the given
equilibrium. Fix also an out of equilibrium export level, Q0.L e tBR(;Q0)d e n o t et h e
set of best responses of the government at Q0 given that (a) the induced beliefs about
the types exporting this quantity are  and (b) the home rm produces its unique






Let i(Q;t) denote the foreign rm's prot over all periods when it exports Q in period 1
and is thereafter subject to a total duty, t. Dene
E0
i (Q0) f t 2 BR(;Q0): i(Q;t)= 
ig
to be the set of best responses of the government which would leave i indierent between
his equilibrium strategy and exporting Q0. Similarly, the set of sequentially rational AD
duties which would make i strictly better o is denoted by
Ei(Q0) f t 2 BR(;Q0): i(Q;t) > 
ig:
We say that a sequential equilibrium outcome is D1 if and only if there exists an equi-
librium giving rise to this outcome which can be supported with beliefs (ijQ0)=0a t
each o equilibrium quantity Q0 whenever
E0
i (Q0) [ Ei(Q0)  Ei0(Q0)( 7 )
for Ei0(Q0) 6= f;g.T h u sD1 requires the beliefs of the government to place probability
zero on type i if whenever i wants to deviate from a particular equilibrium so does i0.
Intuitively, this makes i0 the more likely type to break the equilibrium.
Note that if i is eliminated for quantity Q0 using the D1 criterion then Q0 is never
a weak best response for that type. The reason is that if Q0 were a weak best response
relative to the equilibria giving rise to the proposed outcome (meaning that Q0 yields the
exporter as much as an equilibrium) then by denition the best response duty against
Q0 must be in E0
i (Q0) and hence in Ei0(Q0). This would make i0 deviate. Appealing
14once again to the proposition by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) we could delete such a
Q0 from the strategy set of the exporter of type i without being at risk of eliminating a
stable set of the unrestricted game.
The renement procedure outlined in this section would be useful only if it guaran-
tees the existence of a solution surviving the restrictions. In nite signaling games we
can be assured of this by the fact that a stable set of equilibria contains a sequential
equilibrium. Hence, if we start the process of elimination with a set of equilibria leading
to a stable outcome we will not eliminate this outcome. Since a stable set exists, it
follows that we will not eliminate all equilibria.
As is well known, there are a number of renements of equilibria used in signaling
games. Similar to the D1 criterion in both intuition and game theory justication are
the Intuitive Criterion and the D2 criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). In general D2 is
more stringent than D1 because it further restricts the strategy spaces of the players.
Formally, the steps in applying D2 are the same as the ones outlined above for D1,
except (7) should be replaced with
E0
i (Q0) [ Ei(Q0) [ i06=iEi0(Q0): (70)
In our case, D1 is sucient to give rise to a unique stable outcome of the game.
On the other hand, the Intuitive Criterion is a weaker renement than D1.A ta n
out of equilibrium quantity Q0, the Intuitive Criterion requires assigning probability one
to a given type i if, in combination with the lowest possible sequentially rational tari,
Q0 is (a) preferred by type i to the proposed equilibrium and (b) is not preferred to
the proposed equilibrium by any other type. However, the Intuitive Criterion does not
provide a systematic way to assign beliefs if at Q0 more than one type prefers the lowest
tari to the proposed equilibrium.
It is well known that the Intuitive Criterion is not sucient to support the unique
stable equilibrium if there are more than two types even if the prot function of the
sender exhibits the single crossing property.16 We thus use the D1 renement. Hence,
throughout the remainder of the paper when we use terms like \equilibrium" and \out-
come" we mean \D1 equilibrium" and \D1 outcome."
16See Cho and Kreps (1987) for a discussion of the Spence model with three types.
156. Solution of the subgame prior to the AD petition
We will solve for the rst stage equilibrium by breaking the problem into several steps.
First, we will characterize the foreign rm's isoprot curves and show that the game
falls into a subclass of signaling games with double crossing. Next, we will establish two
conditions: a mimicking condition and a condition that in conjunction with the double
crossing property implies that the most natural outcome is for all types to pool. Finally,
we will describe the behavior of each type in the pooling outcome.
6.1. Isoprot curves and the double crossing property
In the rst period a type i exporter knows that upon observing Q the home rm will
produce according to its best response function
~ q =( a − Q − cd)=2; (8)
From this point on we adopt the convention that if there is no time superscript we are
referring to rst period variables.
The equilibrium rst period prot of the foreign rm when producing Q is
i(Q)=Q(a − Q − 2Ci − 20 + cd)=2: (9)
The incentive compatible constraint for type i can be constructed by dening an
isoprot curve consisting of combinations of quantities Q and duties t which yield the
same total prot, i, given that the home rm produces according to its best response,
(8). From (9) and (3) the isoprot curve is implicitly given by
i = i(Q;t)  i(Q)+( N=9)(a + cd − 2Ci − 2t)2: (10)
Consider the case when the government has full information. In this case each type i
knows that a petition will lead to an AD duty, ~ ti−0. Hence, each type will myopically
maximize its rst period prot yielding
e Qi =( a − 2Ci − 20 + cd)=2a n de i =( a − 2Ci − 20 + cd)2=8; (11)
16and an equilibrium prot over all periods
s
i  (a + cd − 2Ci − 20)2=8+( N=81)(a +3 cd − 4Ci)2:
In Figure 2 we depict the isoprot curves for three types under the full information
outcome. Note that as graphed each rm's preferred set lies to the south of its respective
isoprot curve|for a given quantity, prot increases as the tari falls.
In standard signaling games it is assumed that one type always has a greater incentive
to deviate from a given outcome than another type. This is referred to as the single
crossing property since it implies that the isoprot curves cross only once. We will now
show that the isoprot function of the exporter exhibits a double crossing property. As
will become apparent this property will play a key role in solving for the equilibrium of
the model. By double crossing we mean
Lemma 1 Any two isoprot curves fi;jg, i<j , can cross at most once in either of
the two half-spaces dened by t = 0+Q. If the isoprot curves have a point in common
along t = 0 + Q, then they are tangent at that point. In other words, the graph of the
function t = 0 +Q divides (Q;t)-space in such a way that at any (Q;t) the slope of j
is bigger (smaller) (the same as) the slope of i whenever t>(<)(=)0 + Q.
(All proofs are in the appendix.)
Lemma 1 states that the single crossing assumption is violated in our model. This
implies that the incentives for any two types to deviate from a given outcome dier
depending on the relative sizes of t and Q. Intuitively, the double crossing property
reﬂects the varying incentives to lower current quantity in order to receive a lower duty
in the future. On the one hand, high cost rms already produce less than low cost
rms and hence do not have to distort their sales as much as low cost rms. Thus, in
this respect high cost rms nd it easier to deviate from a given outcome (by lowering
quantities). On the other hand, low cost rms have more to gain if future duties are
lower, and hence they benet more when today's lower exports result in lower duties
tomorrow. Thus, in this respect low cost rms nd it easier to deviate from a given
outcome. Which incentive dominates depends on the relative sizes of t and Q.I f t is

















t = 0 + Q
Figure 2: Isoprot curves under full information
18The double crossing property is graphically depicted in Figure 3. Consider rst
the case when Q>t− 0 (i.e., relatively high quantity levels). This case is depicted
graphically by point X in Figure 3. At the point of intersection (X) the slope of isoprot
c u r v ef o rt h em o r ee  c i e n tt y p e( t y p e1 )i sb i g g e rt h a nt h es l o p eo fi n e  c i e n tt y p e ' s
isoprot curve. This relationship can simply be interpreted as implying that at X a
decrease in exports by 1 is less protable than a decrease by 2.
Consider the other case, when Q<t− 0. This case is depicted by the point Y in
Figure 3. At the point of intersection the slope of the isoprot curve for the ecient
type is smaller than the inecient type's, implying that at Y a decrease in exports by
1i smore protable than a decrease by 2.
Finally, if the two isoprot curves have a point in common along the locus Q = t−0,
they must be tangent at that point. This case is depicted by the point Z in Figure 5
and will be discussed at greater length in Section 6.3. Hereafter, we will refer to the
line t = 0 + Q as the tangency locus.
Another property of the isoprot curve is
Corollary 1 Any isoprot curve can cross the tangency locus at most once.
Corollary 1 implies that an isoprot curve either never crosses the tangency locus or
only crosses the tangency locus once. As will become clear, whether an isoprot curve
crosses the tangency locus depends primarily on the duration of the AD duty.
6.2. The unique candidate for a pure strategy separating equilibrium
We begin by deriving the unique candidate for a pure strategy separating equilibrium.
In order to support such a solution we must provide each type with a quantity, Qs
i,
which is exported with probability one.
If the outcome is a pure strategy separating equilibrium, then the government is able
to infer each type's true cost and will in turn levy the optimal duty, ~ ti. This implies
that type 1's unique separating sequential equilibrium strategy is to maximize its rst
period prot myopically, yielding exports of Qs
1 = e Q1 and prot over all periods of s
1.
The extent to which types j>1 distort exports depends on whether others have
a desire to mimic them. If the game is not to be trivial, we must assume that some i
is willing to mimic some type j, i<j . In general this means s
i < i( e Qj;~ tj). Since
19we are interested in explaining why the most ecient rms restrain their exports, we
require that type 1 be willing to mimic 2,
s
1 < 1( e Q2;~ t2): (12)
In Figure 2 we depict a game where (12) is satised. As depicted, 2's full information
outcome, ( e Q2;~ t2) lies in 1's strictly preferred region. In other words, as depicted 1 has
an incentive to mimic 2, if doing so could induce an AD duty of only ~ t2.
Since s
1 is the minimum prot type 1 will earn in any sequential equilibrium, the
incentive compatible constraint for type 1 can be dened by the locus of quantity-duty
pairs in (10) yielding at least s
1
s
1  1(Q;t): (13)
In Figure 2, (13) is satised for all (Q;t)l y i n gb e l o w s
1 = 1(Q;t).
It is easy to verify that (13) implicitly denes a function which is strictly concave
in Q and symmetric around e Q1.F o re a c hi>1, (13) denes an open set of quantities
around e Q1, Si(1) = (Q
i(1);Qi(1)), which type 1 would strictly prefer to its equilibrium
strategy if the response was ~ ti. The end points of these intervals are
Q
i(1) = e Q1 − (2=9)
p
2N(Ci − C1)(Ci +3 cd + a − 5C1);
Qi(1) = e Q1 +( 2 =9)
p
2N(Ci − C1)(Ci +3 cd + a − 5C1):
Since C1 <C i the above quantities are real. In addition, Si(1) is strictly increasing in
N, implying that the longer the period the AD duty stays in eect, the more type 1
is willing to sacrice if doing so could insure a lower duty. In Figure 3 we depict an
incentive compatible quantity set, S2(1).
Incentive compatibility has several important implications for the behavior of each
type i>1 in a separating equilibrium. For instance, in any pure strategy sequential
separating equilibrium each i>1 would be at least restricted to Q 2S c
i(1), where
Sc
i(1) is dened as the complement of Si(1).17 Type 2's possible quantity choices can
be further restricted by noting that: S2(1) is symmetric around e Q1; Q
2(1) < e Q2 <
17The strategy set of type i, Si(h), may be further restricted by the incentive compatibility constraint















t = 0 + Q
Figure 3: Incentive compatibility constraint for 2 dened by 1
21e Q1 < Q2(1); and, given ~ t2 the prot function of type 2 is symmetric about e Q2.T h e s e
observations imply that the payo for 2 at Q
2(1) is higher than at Q2(1). Moreover,
the fact that 2's prot is monotonically increasing up to e Q2 and decreasing thereafter
implies that Q
2(1) is the unique maximizer among the set of quantities available to 2
in a separating equilibrium. Not surprisingly then it is the unique candidate for a
self-enforcing separating equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 1 Among the set of separating export levels available to 2, Qs
2 = Q
2(1) is
the unique candidate to emerge in equilibrium.
Denote by Q
j(i)a n dQj(i) the end points of the interval Sj(i), 1  i<j . Sj(i)i s
the set of quantities in combination with ~ tj that type i would prefer to s
i. We can also
show
Corollary 2 Qs
j =m i n fQ
j(i)g, 1  i<j , is the unique candidate for a separating
equilibrium strategy for type j.
We depict this candidate separating equilibrium in Figure 4. The candidate for
separating equilibrium has several nice properties. First, the most ecient exporter
does not restrain its exports. Rather, the potential AD duty distorts trade from the less
ecient types who voluntarily restrain their exports in order to separate themselves.
Second, this candidate equilibrium involves the least amount of trade restraint and as
such is the best outcome in the sense of Riley (1979). Finally, this candidate equilibrium
has the desirable characteristic that the optimal duties are levied.
However, we can show that if a weak condition regarding the size of the incentive
compatibility set is satised, this candidate cannot be an equilibrium. This key condition
is
s
1  1(Q = ~ t2 − 0;~ t2): (14)
This condition is satised in both Figures 3 and 4. We will show in Section 7 that this
condition is quite likely to be satised. Graphically, the condition implies the point
dened by the intersection of ~ t2 and the tangency locus, Q = ~ t2−0 lies in 1's preferred
set. Note also that if (14) is satised, then by Corollary 1 all other intersections between


















t = 0 + Q
Figure 4: The unique candidate for a separating equilibrium
Proposition 2 If (14) is satised, then there does not exist a pure strategy separating
equilibrium.
Intuitively, Proposition 2 implies that separating equilibria will not exist whenever
1's desire to avoid optimal AD duties is suciently large. If this is the case, com-
plications arising from the double crossing property arise. Consider for instance the
candidate equilibrium depicted in Figure 3. Since (14) is satised, (Qs
2;~ t2) must lie in
the half-space Q<t− 0, implying that an increase in exports by 1 is less protable
than an increase by 2. If the government observes a deviation from the candidate, it
infers that the rm is type 2 and hence responds with ~ t2. This in turn induces 2 to
deviate from the candidate equilibrium.
236.3. The unique pooling equilibrium
Proposition 2 leads us to explore the possibilities for pooling. The next two lemmas
will provide the candidate for an equilibrium in which more than one type exports the
same quantity and characterize the foreign rm's isoprot function in the equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Fix a pooling outcome in which more than one type exports Qp with positive
probability in the rst period, and the response of the government is tp.T h e ni tm u s t
be that Qp = tp − 0.
Lemma 2 states that any export-duty pair which does not lie on the tangency locus
cannot be a part of a pooling outcome.
We now show that if the indierence curves of two types have a point in common
along the tangency line then everywhere else the isoprot line of the lower type lies
above that of the higher type.
Lemma 3 Let i<j .T h e n i( ^ Q = ^ t − 0;^ t)= i(Q0;t i) and j( ^ Q = ^ t − 0;^ t)=
j(Q0;t j) imply tj <t i.
Figure 5 is useful for clarfying Lemma 3. Consider a point, say Z, on the tangency
locus. By Lemma 1 we know that any two isoprot curves through Z must be tangent.
For example, in Figure 5 we have drawn three isoprot curves containing Z. Lemma 3
implies that the isoprot curves of the higher types are nested within the isoprot curve
of the lower types. For instance, 3's isoprot curve lies within 2's which in turn lies
within 1's isoprot curve. Lemma 3 is important since it implies that the government
can clearly rank each type's incentive to deviate from a candidate on the tangency locus.
In particular, at Z a small deviation is most protable for 1.
U s i n gL e m m a3w ec a na l s os h o w
Corollary 3 If type i pools with positive probability in a sequential equilibrium then
every type j>iexports the pooled quantity with probability one.
We are now ready to prove our main proposition. In particular, we now show that if
(14) is satised, then there is a unique equilibrium in which the AD threat induces all
types to sell the same quantity, which means that the most ecient types voluntarily
restrain their exports in order to receive a lower AD duty.
24Proposition 3 If (14) is satised, then there exists a unique equilibrium in which
type 1 produces the pooled quantity with positive probability and all other types pool with
probability one.
Figure 5 depicts the unique pure pooling equilibrium. Several comments are war-
ranted. First, unlike the separating candidate, in the pure pooling equilibrium the most
ecient rm voluntarily restricts its output prior to the AD investigation. In fact, it is
generally the case that exports are restrained not just by 1 but by many of the more
ecient types. Thus, the pooling equilibrium is consistent with the empirical evidence
(discussed in Section 2) that the threat of an AD duty induces VERs by most ecient
foreign competitors.
Second, depending on the probability distribution , cost-based AD can easily result
in the perception that inecient exporters are more threatening than they actually are.
For instance as depicted, all types i>1 will receive a higher duty than is optimal. This
prediction is again consistent with the empirical evidence. In the steel industry, for
instance, a large number of cases have been led against relatively inecient producers.
This perception was most forcefully asserted during the Uruguay Round negotiations
as representatives from developing countries (i.e., relatively inecient rms) vigorously
negotiated for changes in the rules governing cost-based AD.
Third, these distortions imply that domestic consumers get the worst of both worlds.
Prior to the AD investigation consumers suer as the ecient rms restrict output.
Following the investigation, consumers bear the burden of having overly large AD duties
being levied on inecient rms.
6.4. A necessary and sucient condition
Before concluding this section we would like to relax condition (14) and give a necessary
and sucient condition for the unique equilibrium to involve pooling in exports (not
necessarily by all types) and characterize the outcome. The condition requires type T−1
to prefer the point (Q = ~ tT − 0;~ tT) to its unique candidate separating equilibrium
strategy.
Intuitively, this is the case because Lemma 1 guarantees that if T − 1 prefers to
separate rather than mimic T at (Q = ~ tT − 0;~ tT), then so will every lower type.
Consequently, the separating equilibrium isoprot curves of each lower type lie in the
25right half space dened by the tangency locus. The unique equilibrium of the game will
be in pure strategies where each lower type exports a quantity dened in Corollary 2.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique outcome of the game which involves all but (pos-
sibly) the lowest types exporting the same quantity with positive probability if and only
if s
T−1  T−1(Q = ~ tT − 0;~ tT).
Proposition 3 gives a sucient condition for type 1 to voluntarily restrict exports in
equilibrium. Proposition 4 provides a necessary condition for a type i to participate in
a pool. By replacing i with 1 in the construction of the unique pooling equilibrium we
see that the most ecient type will restrict exports only if s












t = 0 + Q
Figure 5: The unique pooling equilibrium
267. Characterization of the pooling condition
We have argued above that if (14) holds, then pooling is the unique equilibrium. In
this section we will relate this condition to the underlying primitives of the model. For
analytical convenience we will now assume that the foreign rm is one of two possible
types, 1 and 2. We will also assume that cd = C2 and that 0 = ~ t2.
First, we want to establish that the mimicking condition (12) holds. Substituting









In Figure 6 we graph the mimicking condition in A{N space. The mimicking con-
dition is satised for all points lying above the Nm contour. As the graph makes clear,
for all N>1 the mimicking condition holds for all reasonable values of A.F o rN =1
the condition only holds for A 2 (1;49=41). Recall that when a rm restrains exports
to e Q2 some rst period prot is sacriced. If the game is suciently short, the gain
from the lower duty is insucient to induce mimicking. In current U.S. practice, duties
are rarely removed sooner than two years after being imposed. Given this practice we
believe that the relevant scenario is when the the AD duty stays in eect for longer than
one period and thus that the mimicking condition holds for all values of A.
Conditional on (12), the question now is whether (14) is satised. Substituting, we
can show that the pooling condition holds if
N>N p 
9(6A − 5)2
32(5A − 4)(A − 1)
This sucient condition is also graphed in Figure 6 and is satised for all points
lying above the Np contour. The graph shows that the pooling condition is likely to
hold for most reasonable parameter values. In particular, if the duty is levied for at
least several periods, the condition is satised for almost all A. For instance, if N =3 ,















Figure 6: Nm and Np contours
28and if N = 10, the condition holds for all A>1:035.
While the precise values are clearly specic to this example, this exercise does illus-
trate the two general insights. First, the longer is the duration of the post-duty game,
the more likely will the pooling outcome emerge. Second, post-duty game does not have
to be particularly lengthy for pooling to emerge. A review of U.S.'s experience reveals
that AD duties are often quite long-lived. For instance, in the U.S. duties have been in
place for at least 10 years in more than 20% of (armative) AD cases; in fact, according
to ITC (1995), more than half of the AD duties levied between 1955 and 1991 were still
in eect in 1991. Thus, the model's prediction that foreign rms restrain exports in
order to reduce potential AD duties seems plausible.
8. Welfare implications
We would like to conclude our discussion by conducting a simple welfare analysis. As
we did in the previous section we will assume that the foreign rm is one of two possible
types, 1 and 2. The prior probability of type 1 is . We will continue to assume that
cd = C2 and that 0 = ~ t2.
We compare the expected welfare in the pure strategy pooling equilibrium with
a situation in which the government does not have a cost-based AD mechanism. In
keeping with GATT MFN rules, we thus consider an alternative where exporters are
subject to a uniform tari.18
In a pure strategy pooling equilibrium the government levies a duty equal to te −0
where te = ~ t1 +( 1− )~ t2. Regardless of the rm's type, rst period exports are
Qe = te−0 and the domestic rm maximizes its prot taking Qe as given. In subsequent
periods the welfare results from the unique Cournot equilibrium with the AD duty
imposed.
If the government does not have AD law and commits to 0, the welfare would
be calculated from the unique Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria in rst and later
periods, respectively.Using our expression for relative costs (A), the dierence between
the expected equilibrium welfare and the ex-ante expected welfare from precommitment
18The unique ex-ante optimum duty is easily seen to be ~ t1 +( 1− )~ t2. We can perform the welfare
analysis with this tari imposed in all periods, but we want to emphasize that even with suboptimal
taris (and maybe even the worst ex ante tari) the country is still better o without an antidumping
law.
29can be shown from (4) and (5) to be
(N;A;)=( 1 =72)(4N + 11)(A − 1)22 − (1=72)(27A − 14)(A − 1) − 7=288:
() is increasing with N, implying that the longer the duration of the duty the larger
are the losses due to a commitment to a suboptimal duty.
In Figure 7 we depict the zero contours of ()f o rN =5a n dN=10. Cost-based AD
raises welfare in the region lying above the contour. The intuition is quite clear: cost-
based AD raises welfare the more likely the rm is type 1 (higher )a n dt h el o n g e rt h e
duration of the duty (larger N). However, note that if the duty stays on for 5 periods,
the cost dierence between the rms must get quite large before the AD policy raises
welfare. () is positive for a substantial region of the parameter space only for N = 10.
These results along with those in the previous section highlight the importance of
the duration of the duties. This insight makes the Uruguay Round's sunset amendment
particularly relevant. This provision mandates that AD duties must be reviewed after
ve years and the duty should be removed unless there is evidence that doing so will
result in injury. The sunset amendment was designed to limit the attractiveness of
AD actions (to domestic industries) and as such this provision should raise welfare.
Surprisingly, we nd that it may well exacerbate the costs of cost-based AD policy.
9. Concluding Comments
By most accounts the downward trend in trade restrictions was halted (or at least
slowed) in the mid-1970s (Bhagwati, 1988; Krueger, 1995). Blame is usually pointed
to the combination of high-track (VERs) and low-track (AD duties) restraints. In this
paper we have demonstrated that both phenomena can be explained by the fact that
AD laws were broadened to allow for cost-based allegations in the mid-1970s. We have
shown that VERs are undertaken to discourage cost-based AD complaints. However,
we nd that in general the VER does not completely release the protectionist pressures
but rather causes the duties to be clumsily levied.
Our results also help explain why all concerned parties|domestic rms, foreign
rms, and consumers|are unhappy with AD protection. Domestic industries complain
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Figure 7: Zero contour of (N;;A)
31(Stewart, 1991). At the same time, foreign rms often gripe that the duties are excessive.
Our model shows that both charges have validity. The VER distorts the government's
perception of the the foreign rm's eciency and leads to undesirably low (high) duties
on ecient (inecient) competitors. Cost-based duties would be more eciently levied
if the VERs did not interfere with the government's ability to perceive costs. Finally,
consumers suer due to both the anticipatory VER and to the ineptly determined
duty. Our results provide additional evidence that AD law creates a heavy burden
on consumers. All in all, even though cost-based AD raises welfare under complete
information, the distortions inherent with implementing it under incomplete information
make it an undesirable policy|especially if the duties are levied for relatively short
durations. Thus, GATT/WTO parties would likely raise welfare by coupling the recent
sunset provision with additional restrictions on cost-based allegations.
From a technical perspective, our results highlight the importance of the single
crossing assumption in economic models. While this assumption is usually imposed,
our model suggests that those interested in accurately depicting the outcomes in sig-
naling games should formally model agents' payos, i.e., derive payos from more basic
economic primitives. As we have shown the equilibrium depends crucially on whether
the payos satisfy single crossing or double crossing.
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Proof of Lemma 1









a − 2Q − 2Ci − 20 + cd
a − 2t − 2Ci + cd

:
The rst part of the claim follows directly from the denition of (Q;t) and monotonoc-
ity of the prot function. The second part of the claim follows from dierentiating
(Q;t) with respect to Ci at any (Q;t).

Proof of Corollary 1
If the isoprot curve of type i crossed the tangency locus twice then continuity would
imply that i must have another isoprot curve tangent to t = 0 + Q at a point ( ^ Q =
^ t−0;^ t). Lemma 1 shows that an isoprot curve of any i0 through ( ^ Q = ^ t−0;^ t)w o u l d
be tangent also and both curves would lie in the same half space dened by t = 0 + Q
at least in a -neighborhood of ( ^ Q = ^ t− 0;^ t). Since prot is continuous we can always
nd a suciently small -perturbation of the payo of one type so that the isoprot
curves cross twice within  of ( ^ Q = ^ t − 0;^ t). This would violate Lemma 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Fix a sequential separating equilibrium outcome obtained from 2 exporting Q 2S c
2(1),
Q 6= Q
2(1), and 1 exporting e Q1. Take an out of equilibrium message Q0 2S c
2(1) such
that jQ − e Q1j > jQ0 − e Q1j.
Let us construct the sets of sequentially rational responses of the government to Q0
which would make each type break the equilibrium. By the denition (incentive com-
patibility) of S2(1) no duty t 2 [~ t2;~ t1] would make 1 deviate from e Q1 to Q0.C o n t i n u i t y
and monotonicity of 2's prot function guarantee that exporting Q0 would be strictly
preferred to Q if that would make the country impose ~ t2 (or any lower duty). Hence,
E0
1(Q0) [ E1(Q0)  E2(Q0);
and the D1 criterion requires the beliefs of the government to place probability zero on




ij (ijQ) ,i fi0  j
0 , otherwise
:
Since the best reply of the government is decreasing in its beliefs this would make 2
defect from the equilibrium.
We could make the same argument for all Q 6= Q
2(1). Hence the unique candidate
separating D1 equilibrium outcome is the one arising from type 2 exporting Q
2(1). 
Proof of Corollary 2
Note that the strict concavity of the separating equilibrium isoprot curve for type 1
implies that Qj(1) > Qi(1) for j>i>1. On the other hand, Lemma 1 implies that
i(Qi(1);~ ti) > i(Qj(1);~ tj). Hence Qj(1) > Qj(i);8j>i>1 and each type j is
constrained only by type 1 at high quantity levels.
Starting with type 3, for each type j  3 apply the arguments used in Proposition 1
to show that any quantity Q0 > Qj(1) in combination with ~ tj is inferior to Qj(1). This
is the case because the D1 criterion concentrates the beliefs of the government on k  j
and the corresponding best response would make j deviate from Q0.
Fix a candidate equilibrium in which each type j exports Qj(1). To see that Qj(1)
is not a stable equilibrium we use Lemma 1 once again to claim that
E0
1(Qj(1) − ) [ E1(Qj(1) − )  Ej(Qj(1) − ):
Since j(Qj(1);~ tj) > j(Qj−1(1);~ tj−1), D1 requires that the response of the govern-
ment at Qj−1(1)− be at most ~ tj−1 which is sucient to discard Qj−1(1) as a candidate
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 showed that the unique candidate for a D1 strategy for 2 is Qs
2 = Q
2(1).
Let ^ ^ Q =m i n fQ
3(1);Q
3(2)g. Then both type 1 and type 2 are content with separation
rather than mimic type 3 at Q0 < ^ ^ Q and get ~ t3. Hence D1 would restrict the beliefs of
the government to i  3a tQ0 + < ^ ^ Q and the sequentially rational tari would make
3 deviate from Q0. The arguments for all other types are identical. 
Proof of Proposition 2
37Proposition 1 implies that it is sucient to prove that Q
2(1) is not a D1 strategy for 2.
Let us x the outcome arising from 2 exporting Q
2(1). By construction Q
2(1) < ~ t2−0,
which guarantees that the isoprot curve of 2 through (Q
2(1);~ t2) has a slope which is
bigger than the corresponding slope for type 1 (by Lemma 1). This implies that for Q0
-bigger than Q
2(1) the set of sequentially rational duties weakly preferred to (Q
2(1);~ t2)
by 1 in combination with Q0 is a subset of the best responses which 2 strictly prefers
to its equilibrium action. If the given equilibrium produces a D1 outcome we should be
able to support it with beliefs ji2 at Q0. Hence the best response of the government
is at most ~ t2. Since, with any t  ~ t2 xed, the prot of 2 is monotonically increasing in
Q at Q
2(1), type 2 would deviate to Q0, thus upsetting the unique candidate for a D1
pure strategy separating equilibrium outcome. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Without loss of generality assume that Qp <t p − 0.L e ti be the highest type in the
pool. Then tp > ~ ti. Lemma 1 guarantees that in a D1 equilibrium the beliefs of the
government at Q0 -smaller than Qp should place (i0jQ0) = 0 for all i0 <i . Hence
the response of the government at Q0 should be less than or equal to ~ ti.C o n t i n u i t yo f
the exporter's payo in Q0 would make i strictly better o deviating from the pool for
suciently small . 
Proof of Lemma 3
In Corollary 2 we established that any point ( ^ Q = ^ t−0;^ t) is the unique intersection of
the tangency locus with the isoprot function j( ^ Q;^ t)= j(Q;t)s ot h a ta n yQ0 < ^ Q
and t0 such that j( ^ Q;^ t)= j(Q0;t 0) implies t0 >Q 0 + 0.
Assume that at Q0 < ^ Q, i( ^ Q;^ t)= i(Q0;t i)a n d j( ^ Q;^ t)= j(Q0;t j)w i t htj >t i,
so that the isoprot curve of j through ( ^ Q;^ t) is above that of i. We will show that this
assumption leads to a contradiction. By monotonicity of the prot in t we have
i( ^ Q;^ t)= i(Q0;t i) > i(Q0;t j): (A.1)
On the other hand, since tj > 0 + Q0, Lemma 1 shows that the slope of j's isoprot
curve through (Q0;t j) is bigger than the corresponding slope for i.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
i( ^ Q;^ t)  i(Q0;t j) ) j( ^ Q;^ t) > j(Q0;t j):
38The last statement contradicts (A.1) and the construction of tj as j( ^ Q;^ t)= j(Q0;t j).
Similar arguments hold for Q0 > ^ Q. 
Proof of Corollary 3
Suppose that i is the lowest type in the pool and j>irandomizes in equilibrium between
some Q and the pooled quantity Qp.T h e n j must be indierent between Q and Qp.
Since the equilibrium isoprot curve of i is everywhere above that of j according to
Lemma 3, it must be that Q is strictly preferred to the equilibrium by i in combination
with the equilibrium tari of the government at Q. This would break the pool. 
Proof of Proposition 3
By Proposition 2 (and the remarks following) no type can separate from type 1 in a D1
equilibrium. Moreover, Lemma 1 guarantees that if type 1 weakly prefers a point along
the tangency line to a given point (Q;t) then every higher type strictly prefers the point
along t = 0 + Q to (Q;t). Hence if type 1 is in an equilibrium pool so are all higher
types.
N o ww es h o wt h a ta l lt y p e si  1 pool with probability one. If 
1 is the equilibrium
payo for 1, it must be that 
1  s
1. Monotonicity in t implies that for all Q the
isoprot curve yielding prot 
1 is below the complete information isoprot curve for
1. By Lemma 3 the response of the government to Q must be t = Q + 0 and the
equilibrium isoprot curve for i  2 giving payo 
i must be everywhere below the
equilibrium curve for 1 by Lemma 3. Since the isoprot locus dened by s
1 is under
t = ~ t1, 8Q, the equilibrium payo for i  2 must be strictly higher than producing any
Q in combination with ~ t1.
The description of the equilibrium isoprot curves given by Lemma 3 implies that
8Q 6= Q and i  2
E0
i (Q) [ Ei(Q)  E1(Q):
Hence in a D1 equilibrium the beliefs of the government at Q 6= Q must place proba-
bility one on 1 and the corresponding duty should be ~ t1. As shown above, every type i,
i  2, is strictly better o in equilibrium than producing Q in combination with ~ t1;
hence, every i  2e x p o r t sQ with probability one.
We now consider the government's and type 1's equilibrium strategies. Let te 
argmaxt w(;t)  0 denote the ex-ante optimal duty.
39First suppose that the prior probability, , is such that s
1  1(Qe = te − 0;t e).
We claim that in this case, type 1 can not pool with probability one in any sequential
equilibrium. This follows from the fact that if 1 pools with probability one, then the
unique best response of the government would be te to the quantity Qe = te − 0.T h e
point (Qe;t e) is strictly inferior for 1 compared to full separation at e Q1. This implies
that the only possible solution must involve partial pooling.
As argued above, in any D1 pooling equilibrium all disequilibrium beliefs will induce
the government to impose ~ t1. The strict concavity of 1's prot function will then
guarantee that the only quantity produced with positive probability and met with ~ t1 is
the unique maximizer, e Q1. Moreover, the payo from such an action must be equal to
the payo at the pooled message if 1 is to randomize. This implies that the pool must
occur at the point of intersection of 1's complete information isoprot curve (10) and
the tangency locus. Denote this quantity Qp.S i n c e 1(Q;BR(Qp;ji2 +( 1− )))
is a continuous strictly increasing function of  there exists a unique solution to
s
1 = 1(Qp;BR(Qp;ji2 +( 1− )))
such that if 1 puts weight  on Qp and 1− on e Q1, tp would be the unique best response
to Qp.
Second, suppose now that the prior probability, , is such that s
1 < 1(Qe = te −
0;t e). In this case type 1 would rather pool at Qe = te −0 than separate. The partial
pooling equilibrium described in the preceding paragraph is not even sequential in this
case since the posterior making te a sequential best response would require 1 to export
Qp with probability larger than one. (Keep in mind that in any D1 pooling equilibrium
i  2 must pool with probability one.) This shows that the only D1 equilibrium is
in pure strategies at exports Qe and duty level te. The o equilibrium response is
~ t1; 8Q 6= Qe. The domestic rm produces according to (8) in response to Qe.
Finally, note that if te < 0 then no AD petition will be led in equilibrium and the
rms simply maximize prots myopically and the tari remains at 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: Let Qs
i, as dened in Corollary 2, be the unique candidate for a D1 separating
equilibrium strategy for i.T h e n s
i = ( Qs
i;~ ti − 0).
To show necessity observe that s
T−1 > T−1(Q = ~ tT −0;~ tT) implies s
i > i(Q =
40~ tT − 0;~ tT) by Lemma 1. It follows that Qs
i >Q= ~ ti − 0 for all i,a n dQs
i <Q s
i−1.
Hence by Lemma 1 the isoprot curve for i through (Qs
i;~ ti) has a slope smaller than
t h ei s o p r o  tc u r v eo ft y p ei − 1 through the same point. In fact the isoprot curve for
type i is below the curve for type i − 1 for export levels higher than Qs
i and above the
curve for i − 1 at quantities smaller than Qs
i. Hence D1 requires that the beliefs of the
government be placed on type i − 1 at o equilibrium exports Q 2 (Qs
i;Q s
i−1) for all i.
Above e Q1 the government levies a duty of ~ t1−0,a n db e l o wQs
T the response is ~ tT −0.
These beliefs support the outcome in which every type i exports a distinct quantity
Qs
i with probability one as the unique outcome of the game. By Lemma 2 no pooling
equilibria exist.
We now show that if the condition of the proposition holds there exists a unique D1
equilibrium and that in this outcome all but possibly the lowest types export the same
quantity with positive probability.
Assume that s
T−1 > T−1(Q = ~ tT −0;~ tT)a n dl e tt y p ei be the smallest type such
that s
i > i(Q = ~ tT − 0;~ tT). According to Corollary 1 for each j  i there exists a
unique point ( ^ Qj = ^ tj − 0;^ tj) such that s
j = j( ^ Qj;^ tj). Recall that if a type prefers
a point along the tangency locus to its separating strategy so does every higher type.
Hence if a type pools, every higher type produces the pooled quantity with probability
one by Corollary 3. Every type lower than i separates with a pure strategy. We now
construct the unique equilibrium by induction on j.
1. Suppose that t(jji)  ^ ti.I n t h i s c a s e a l l j  i pool with probability one
at Q = t(jji) − 0. The unique sequentially rational response to the pooled
quantity is t(jji).
2. If t(jji) > ^ ti we have two possibilities.
(a) Assume that t(jji+1) < ^ ti. In this case there exists a unique mixed strategy
for type i in which it randomizes between Qs
i and ^ Qi in a way that makes
^ ti a sequential response for the government. (The construction of the mixed
strategy for i is the same as the one for type 1 in Proposition 3.) All j  i
export ^ Qi with probability one.
(b) Let t(jji+1)  ^ ti. If type i pools we know that all j  i would pool with
probability one. Hence the equilibrium response of the government must be
41bigger than t(jji+1). This implies that i would separate at Qs
i.
Suppose now that all types smaller than a type r>iseparate. From the preceding
analysis it must be that t(jjr)  ^ tr−1.
1. If t(jjr)  ^ tr then all j  r produce Q = t(jjr) − 0 with probability one.
2. If t(jjr) > ^ tr we are facing two scenarios.
(a) Let t(jjr+1) < ^ tr.I nt h i sc a s er mixes between Qs
r and ^ Qr,a l lj  r export
^ Qr with probability one, and the equilibrium duty is ^ tr − 0.
(b) If t(jjr+1)  ^ tr type r separates at Qs
r with probability one.
This completes the induction.
Since by assumption ^ tT−1 > ~ tT separation is not feasible for T − 1b yt h ea b o v e
construction. Hence in any D1 equilibrium at least types T and T − 1e x p o r tt h es a m e
quantity with positive probability.
It is easy to see that if i is the lowest type in a pool, D1 restricts the o equilibrium
response of the government to ~ ti in the neighborhood of the pool where the equilibrium
isoprot curve for i is above that of i − 1. For lower quantity levels the beliefs are
concentrated on the type willing to break the equilibrium at the highest duty. By
Lemma 1 this is necessarily a type smaller than i. For export levels where the equilibrium
isoprot curve of i is below the isoprot curve for i−1 but (necessarily) lower than Qs
i−1
the beliefs are concentrated on i − 1. For any j  i − 1 the beliefs of the government
are placed on j−1 between Qs
j and Qs
j−1. For export levels higher than the equilibrium
quantity of type 1 the response is ~ t1. This is the unique system of beliefs which satisfy
D1 and they trivially support the pooling outcome of the game. 
42